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Federal Student Loan Policy








The Institute for College Access and Success
The need for higher education and training has never been as impor-
tant to individuals and our economy as it is today, yet its affordability 
is seriously in question. College costs have skyrocketed, as family 
incomes and state funding for public higher education have declined, 
leading millions to take on student debt, drop out, or struggle to keep 
up with classes while working many hours per week to pay the bills. 
Even after recent signifi cant increases, the maximum Pell Grant today 
covers the smallest share of the cost of attending a public college since 
the start of the program 40 years ago. It should be no surprise that the 
gaps in college enrollment, persistence, and graduation between stu-
dents from high- and low-income families have widened over the last 
30 years, threatening both the American Dream and our nation’s eco-
nomic competitiveness.
Although these gaps cannot be closed with fi nancial aid policy 
alone, research shows that it can increase enrollment and completion. 
This chapter focuses specifi cally on student loan policy at the federal 
level and offers a number of recommendations to reduce complexity, 
improve targeting, contain debt burdens, and encourage completion and 
wise borrowing. These recommendations are part of a comprehensive 
package of reforms to federal student aid, detailed in our 2013 white 
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paper, Aligning the Means and the Ends: How to Improve Federal Stu-
dent Aid and Increase College Access and Success (The Institute for 
College Access and Success [TICAS] 2013). Unless otherwise noted, 
the information in this chapter is drawn from that paper. 
BACKGROUND
As context for our recommendations, we provide some brief back-
ground information about federal and private student loans.
Federal Student Loans
The current federal student loan program is too complex, its ben-
efi ts are poorly targeted, and its terms are too arbitrary. Much of the 
complexity is a holdover from when banks received subsidies to make 
Stafford Loans with terms set and guaranteed by the government. The 
resulting rules shielded banks—but not borrowers or taxpayers—from 
risk. Now that these federal loans are made directly and more cost-
effectively by the U.S. Department of Education, the entire student loan 
system can and should be streamlined and improved.
From the myriad types and terms of different loans to the repayment 
process, it can be hard to fi gure out how federal student loans work. 
Consider, for example, the main source of undergraduate loans since 
July 2010: the Direct Stafford Loan program. There are “subsidized” 
and “unsubsidized” Stafford Loans, each with different eligibility crite-
ria and treatment of interest during school and periods of deferment and 
with separate caps on how much a student can borrow each year and 
cumulatively. The vast majority (82 percent) of undergraduates with 
subsidized loans also have unsubsidized loans, so some of their loans 
accrue interest while they are in school and some do not.1 
Subsidized loans currently provide students with valuable benefi ts, 
including a low fi xed interest rate and no interest accrual while they 
are in school.2 However, these benefi ts are not well targeted, as high-
income students may qualify just because they attend a high-cost col-
lege, and most students with subsidized loans also have unsubsidized 
loans.
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All Stafford Loans offer fl exible repayment plans, as well as loan 
deferments and forbearances, yet more than one in eight student loan 
borrowers is defaulting within three years of entering repayment.3 The 
consequences of defaulting on a federal loan can follow borrowers for 
the rest of their lives, ruining their credit, making it diffi cult to buy a 
car or rent an apartment, and limiting their job prospects. They may 
also face garnished wages, seized income tax refunds, and diminished 
Social Security checks.
Private Loans
Private educational loans are a much riskier way to pay for college 
than federal student loans. Most private loans have variable, uncapped 
interest rates and require a cosigner (U.S. Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau and U.S. Department of Education 2012). No more a form 
of fi nancial aid than a credit card, private loans typically have interest 
rates that, regardless of whether they are fi xed or variable, are high-
est for those who can least afford them. Private loans lack the basic 
consumer protections and fl exible repayment options of federal student 
loans, such as unemployment deferment, income-driven repayment, 
and loan forgiveness programs. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Reform is clearly and urgently needed. Our loan recommendations 
aim to better support access and success while containing costs and 
risks for both students and taxpayers. To achieve those goals, we pro-
pose simplifying the loan program, improving the targeting of benefi ts, 
containing debt burdens, and encouraging wise borrowing. Our recom-
mendations include the following:
• Provide a single undergraduate student loan with no fees, a 
low in-school interest rate, and a fi xed rate in repayment that is 
never much higher than the rate on loans being offered to cur-
rent students.
• Streamline and improve federal loan repayment options.
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• Improve the timing, content, and effectiveness of student loan 
counseling.
• Reduce the number of student loan defaults.
• Reform the student loan collections process.
• Strengthen consumer protections for private loan borrowers.
One Simple, Affordable Undergraduate Loan Program
 We propose replacing the current Stafford Loans with one sim-
ple, affordable undergraduate loan. Our recommended changes are 
designed to simplify the loan program, ensure that loans both appear 
and are affordable for borrowers, and better align the cost of the loan 
for the student with the costs for the government. There is no way to 
perfectly balance all three of these goals. However, what we propose 
is an important step forward on each front, focused on making federal 
student loans a more effective tool for ensuring access and supporting 
success while containing risk for both the student and the taxpayer. 
Specifi cally, we recommend that there be only one federal loan for 
undergraduate students, in place of the subsidized and unsubsidized 
Stafford Loans available today. A single loan will be much easier for 
borrowers to understand and monitor, and for schools and the Depart-
ment of Education to administer. This loan—which we refer to in this 
chapter as the One Loan—has an interest rate that is lower while the 
student is in school and higher by a set margin, but capped, when the 
borrower enters repayment. The interest rates are tied to the govern-
ment’s cost of borrowing and designed to help offset the cost of the loan 
program, rather than being arbitrarily set by Congress.4 The features of 
One Loans are described in the sections below. 
Fixed interest rates and no fees
Fixed rates are important to provide certainty, predictability, and 
reassurance to students, many of whom have never borrowed before and 
may not fully understand the consequences of variable rates. The recent 
mortgage crisis demonstrated all too clearly that millions of Ameri-
cans with mortgages did not understand the risks of variable rates, with 
terrible consequences for both them and our nation’s economy. Fixed 
interest rates also further distinguish One Loans, which are a form of 
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fi nancial aid, from other fi nancial products such as credit cards and 
private loans. As mentioned earlier, interest rates on private loans are 
usually variable, like a credit card. The private loans that offer fi xed 
rates will almost certainly have higher interest rates than One Loans for 
all borrowers except those who have, or whose cosigners have, pristine 
credit. At the height of the lending boom in 2007–2008, a majority of 
private student loan borrowers had not taken out as much as they could 
have in federal loans fi rst, underscoring the need to clearly distinguish 
federal student loans from private loans (TICAS 2011a). 
The One Loan’s fi xed rate is tied to the government’s cost of lend-
ing in the year the loan is disbursed. For instance, the interest rate on all 
loans disbursed in a given school year might be set based on the interest 
rate on the one-year Treasury bill or 10-year Treasury note at the fi nal 
auction preceding June 1 of that year. Students who take out One Loans 
each year that they are in school may end up having loans with different 
interest rates, depending on the market conditions each year. However, 
all the other terms of their One Loans would be the same. 
There is no reason for the new loan to have fees, which are rem-
nants of the bank-based guaranteed loan program and add unneeded 
complexity to the loan. The fi xed interest rate will be set to cover the 
cost of One Loans without needing to add supplemental fees. 
Low in-school interest rate
The in-school interest rate on One Loans is based on the govern-
ment’s actual cost of borrowing when the loans are made. The rate for 
new loans would take effect each year on July 1 and apply to all loans 
issued through June 30 of the following year. The in-school rate applies 
while the borrower is enrolled at least half-time and during a six-month 
grace period after she leaves school, similar to the usual timing of the 
interest subsidy on subsidized Stafford Loans. Having a lower interest 
rate when students are in school is intended to encourage them to stay 
enrolled and complete their education, knowing that their interest rate 
will rise if they stop out or drop out.5 Lower in-school interest rates also 
help encourage the use of federal loans over private loans or other types 
of fi nancing available to consumers with limited or no credit histories. 
Charging a low in-school rate, rather than charging no interest, while 
the student is enrolled is designed to both lower the cost of providing 
the loan and discourage students from dragging out their time in school.
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Higher, but capped, out-of-school rate
The One Loan’s out-of-school interest rate is set at the in-school 
rate when the loans were taken out, plus a fi xed margin designed to 
cover the cost of the loan program, including the interest-rate insurance 
described below, loan forgiveness and discharge, and administrative 
costs. For example, imagine a One Loan with an in-school interest rate 
of 3 percent based on the government’s cost of borrowing that year. 
If, for illustration purposes only, the repayment rate were set at the in-
school rate plus two percentage points, it would have an out-of-school 
interest rate of 5 percent. The out-of-school rate, while higher than the 
in-school rate, must be low enough to ensure that federal loans are—
and look like—fi nancial aid in contrast to other types of fi nancing such 
as private loans.
The out-of-school interest rate on the One Loan will be subject to a 
universal cap, like Stafford Loan interest rates; currently the undergrad-
uate Stafford Loan interest rate is capped at 8.25 percent.6 A universal 
cap protects consumers from extremely high rates in the economy and 
reinforces the differences between federal loans and commercial fi nan-
cial products. For example, if the universal cap were 7 percent, the 
in-school interest rate were 6 percent, and the repayment rate set at the 
in-school rate plus two percentage points, the loan would have an out-
of-school interest rate of 7 percent because the cap would keep the rate 
from rising above 7 percent.
Interest-rate insurance
The One Loan has an important new feature: a form of insurance 
that prevents interest rates from ever being too much higher than the 
rate on loans being offered to current students. This feature addresses 
the major disadvantage of fi xed rates for borrowers, without requiring 
refi nancing or consolidation. To prevent borrowers from getting stuck 
with high fi xed rates when market rates decline signifi cantly, the inter-
est rate on One Loans will reset to a lower fi xed rate when interest rates 
in the economy drop substantially from when the loan was issued. 
For example, the interest-rate insurance might prevent outstanding 
One Loans from having a rate that is more than two percentage points 
above the rate on loans being offered to current students. If a borrower 
had a One Loan with an out-of-school interest rate of 6.5 percent, and 
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interest rates dropped so that the One Loans to current students had 
an out-of-school rate of 3.8 percent, the borrower’s interest rate would 
automatically drop from 6.5 percent to 5.8 percent, so that the rate was 
no more than two percentage points above the current rate. 
The interest rate on affected One Loans would not increase, even if 
rates in the economy do. This helps borrowers who go to school when 
interest rates are unusually high, while avoiding the uncertainty and risk 
of a variable rate for all borrowers. We believe this interest rate insur-
ance, which has some similarities to existing fi nancial instruments (e.g., 
swaptions) can be provided at a reasonable cost to both borrowers and 
taxpayers, and incorporated into the fi xed margin in the out-of-school 
interest rate.7 The cost of this feature will depend on the selected inter-
est rate margin, universal cap, and the specifi cs of the insurance.
Interest-free deferments for Pell Grant recipients
In addition to the One Loan’s low in-school rate, universal interest 
rate cap, and interest rate insurance, which apply to all borrowers, the 
One Loan provides additional protection to borrowers from low-income 
families. Pell Grant recipients who take out loans would be eligible for 
interest-free deferments during periods of unemployment and economic 
hardship, just as with subsidized Stafford Loans currently.8 
Subsidized Stafford Loans do not accrue interest while the borrower 
is in school, during the six-month grace period, or when payments are 
deferred for certain reasons after the borrower leaves school, includ-
ing periods of unemployment and the fi rst three years in IBR or PAYE 
if income-driven payments are less than monthly interest.9 However, 
as mentioned above, these valuable benefi ts are not well targeted for 
several reasons: high-income students may qualify for subsidized loans 
just because they attend a high-cost college; and the vast majority of 
students with subsidized loans also have unsubsidized loans, which 
accrue interest during these periods.
The One Loan better targets these valuable benefi ts to the borrow-
ers who most need them, when they need them most. Borrowers who 
received Pell Grants, by defi nition, come from low- and moderate-
income families and are therefore much less likely to have family mem-
bers who can support them during periods of unemployment or low 
earnings. The loans will provide interest relief on all loans held by Pell 
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Grant recipients, rather than just some of their loans, when they are 
unemployed or their incomes are too low to cover their interest in an 
income-driven repayment plan.
Retain current loan limits
The loans will have the same aggregate loan limits as Stafford 
Loans: currently $31,000 for dependent undergraduates and $57,500 
for independent undergraduates. Student loans have become a fact of 
life for more and more Americans, and there is widespread and under-
standable concern about high and pervasive debt levels. Federal loan 
limits provide a necessary signal to students and colleges about how 
much borrowing might be too much. The higher loan limits for inde-
pendent students rightly recognize that these students have greater 
fi nancial responsibilities and may need to borrow more to stay and suc-
ceed in school.10 
Some have suggested raising the current loan limits, while others 
have suggested lowering them, but the data do not support either sug-
gestion (TICAS 2012a,b). As mentioned earlier, average debt for 2011 
graduates of public and nonprofi t four-year colleges was well below the 
aggregate limits—the average including private loans was $26,600 for 
the two-thirds who borrowed, and one-third of graduates had no student 
debt (TICAS 2012c). The majority of undergraduates who borrow pri-
vate education loans could have borrowed more in federal student loans 
before turning to the riskier private market (TICAS 2011a). Finally, 
colleges already have the authority to limit or deny loans for individual 
students on a case-by-case basis (TICAS 2012d). 
The Department of Education should, however, analyze the poten-
tial effects of prorating federal student loans by attendance status. 
Unlike Pell Grants, federal loans are not prorated based on a student’s 
attendance status. In other words, students enrolled half time receive 
a prorated portion of the Pell Grant that students enrolled full time 
receive, but may receive the same loan amount as a full-time student. 
Students who take out full loans but make only part-time progress may 
be at an increased risk of dropping out and defaulting. Students who 
attend college part time are less likely to complete a degree or certifi -
cate (U.S. Department of Education 2011), and failure to complete a 
degree or certifi cate is one of the strongest predictors of future default 
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(Nguyen 2011; Gross et al. 2009). They may also be at greater risk of 
exhausting their loan eligibility before completing their degree. Prorat-
ing loans would involve reducing student eligibility for federal loans 
at a time when college is getting harder to afford, but it is possible that 
it could help encourage students to enroll in more courses per term, 
thereby completing a degree and reducing their risk of default. Given 
both the risks and the potential benefi ts, such a change warrants careful 
analysis and consideration.
Streamline and Improve Federal Loan Repayment Options
 We have identifi ed several ways to simplify and improve federal 
loan repayment options to help borrowers manage their debt, and 
reduce the fi nancial distress and defaults that undermine the goals of 
increased enrollment and completion. There is even more complexity 
on the repayment side of the federal loan process than on the borrowing 
side. The number of repayment options and the variation in eligibility 
requirements, costs, and benefi ts can be overwhelming, even for those 
working in the fi eld. With so many choices and variables, comparisons 
can become unwieldy and confusing, and borrowers may be more likely 
to end up in plans that do not fi t their needs or goals. However, having 
some well-designed choices, combined with timely and effective coun-
seling, can help borrowers fi nd a good fi t for their own situation, stay in 
repayment, and avoid default.
Let borrowers make one loan payment for all their
federal loans
To reduce complexity and make it easier to stay current on their 
loans, we recommend that borrowers be able to make a single pay-
ment that covers all of their federal loans. Currently, this can only be 
accomplished through a separate consolidation process, which is a sig-
nifi cant bureaucratic hurdle for borrowers and has trade-offs that are not 
in every borrower’s best interest.11 Borrowers should not have to con-
solidate their loans just to avoid making multiple payments to multiple 
servicers on their federal student loans each month. 
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Base repayment plan eligibility on total federal loan debt 
The “standard” repayment plan for unconsolidated federal loans is 
currently a 10-year plan. Borrowers are automatically enrolled in this 
plan if they do not actively choose a different one before their fi rst pay-
ment (U.S. Department of Education 2013a). If borrowers owe more 
than $30,000, they may be able to choose an “extended” 25-year plan 
instead, but only if they owe that much within one loan program.12 For 
example, if they owe $31,000 in the Federal Family Education Loan 
Program (FFELP) or $31,000 in Direct Loans, they may qualify for the 
extended plan. But if they owe $15,000 in Direct Loans and $16,000 in 
FFELP Loans, they do not qualify. In contrast, total federal student loan 
debt, along with the borrower’s income, is used to determine eligibility 
for income-driven repayment plans, in which borrowers pay for up to 
20 or 25 years.13 Meanwhile, borrowers who combine their loans into a 
Direct Consolidation Loan have access to “standard” repayment plans 
that gradually increase from 10 to 30 years depending on the borrowers’ 
total federal loan debt.14 Any signal to borrowers about optimal repay-
ment periods, if one were ever intended, gets lost in all this complexity, 
and what is optimal to one borrower may not be for another.
Instead, we recommend that all borrowers have access to repayment 
plans based on their total federal student loan debt, with incremen-
tally longer repayment periods available to those with larger total 
debt. Making these repayment options consistent for all loans would 
greatly simplify the process for borrowers, especially when paired with 
improved loan counseling that helps them identify their priorities and 
see which plan is the best fi t. Borrowers who want to reduce the overall 
cost of their debt by paying it down faster will be able to select shorter 
repayment plans and make prepayments without penalty, as they can 
now. Borrowers who want assurance that their monthly payments will 
remain affordable, given their income, will have access to a streamlined 
income-driven plan, as discussed in detail below. Additionally, borrow-
ers who want all their payments to count toward Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness will always be able to choose a 10-year payment plan.15 
Currently, as mentioned above, borrowers who do not select a 
repayment plan are automatically placed in a 10-year plan, making it 
the “default” plan. A 10-year plan has signifi cant benefi ts for borrow-
ers if they can afford the monthly payments, which are higher than the 
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monthly payments in longer plans. Given the growth in student debt 
levels over the past generation, a 10-year plan may be increasingly 
unrealistic for many borrowers.16 Automatically enrolling borrowers in 
this plan, regardless of their total debt levels, could be setting some bor-
rowers up to fail.
Nevertheless, there are trade-offs between shorter and longer 
repayment plans. Longer repayment periods provide lower monthly 
payments but also cost borrowers more over the life of the loan. The 
best plan for one borrower may not be the best for another borrower. 
The decision of which repayment plan is most appropriate for any given 
borrower—whether made by the individual or by the Department of 
Education through the selection of a “default” or mandatory plan—is 
important and needs to be considered carefully. As we discuss later 
in the chapter, loan counseling should be improved to help borrowers 
decide which plan is best for them. The Department of Education should 
also carefully analyze data on borrowers’ repayment plan choices and 
outcomes—including their ability to make payments and total amount 
paid—to determine whether a 10-year plan remains the best option for 
borrowers who do not actively select another plan. It should also con-
sider the broader implications of changing the default repayment plans 
for borrowers, colleges, and taxpayers.
Give all borrowers access to a single, improved income-driven 
repayment plan 
When Congress created the Income-Based Repayment plan (IBR) 
for federal loans in 2007, it was a major step forward for student loan 
borrowers.17 TICAS, through its Project on Student Debt, developed 
the policy proposal that laid the groundwork for IBR (TICAS et al. 
2006). We fi rst consulted with stakeholders on all sides and conducted 
an in-depth analysis of debt burdens and repayment plans. This analysis 
found that protections and options for borrowers with high debt relative 
to their income were inadequate, inconsistent, and inaccessible (TICAS 
2006). With America’s higher education system increasingly reliant 
on student loans, and the consequences of default so severe and long-
lasting, students were bearing too much of the risk to ensure access or 
support success. We developed a “Plan for Fair Loan Payments” that 
called for affordable payments based on income and family size, cover-
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age of both Direct and FFELP Loans, and a light at the end of the tunnel 
with forgiveness after 20 years of income-driven payments. These 
goals were supported by thousands of students, higher education lead-
ers, loan industry representatives, civil rights groups, Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress, and organizations representing parents, college 
counselors, and others.18 
Thanks to the broad coalition that helped make the case for a solu-
tion, IBR became available to all federal loan borrowers in July 2009 
(TICAS 2009). Despite the absence of much publicity or borrower 
outreach in the fi rst few years of the program, more than 1.3 million 
borrowers were enrolled in IBR by the winter of 2012 (U.S. Department 
of Education 2013b). IBR caps monthly payments at a manageable 
share of income and forgives any principal or interest that remains 
after 25 years of payments. To qualify, borrowers must have a “par-
tial fi nancial hardship,” defi ned as a debt-to-income ratio that makes a 
10-year payment unaffordable. Required payments can be as low as $0 
for borrowers with very low incomes, and payments rise incrementally 
with income. Payments are capped at the lower of the monthly pay-
ment under the standard 10-year plan, or 15 percent of “discretionary 
income,” which is defi ned as adjusted gross income (AGI) minus 150 
percent of poverty for the borrower’s family size.19 
In recent years, the number of repayment options similar to IBR 
has grown. In early 2010, Congress passed the president’s proposal to 
expand IBR for future borrowers (White House 2010). Starting in July 
2014, new borrowers will be able to qualify for a lower monthly payment 
and shorter forgiveness period than the current IBR program provides: 
10 percent of discretionary income and 20 years, instead of 15 percent 
and 25 years. In the fall of 2010, President Obama announced a new 
Pay As You Earn plan to give an estimated 1.6 million current students 
and recent graduates access to the same lower payment cap and shorter 
forgiveness period, with the goal of offsetting the recession’s effect on 
their job prospects and earnings (White House 2011 and TICAS 2012f). 
To qualify for Pay As You Earn, students must have borrowed their 
fi rst loan after September 30, 2007, and received at least one federal 
loan disbursement after September 30, 2011. Pay As You Earn became 
available to eligible borrowers in December 2012 through regulatory 
additions to a preexisting program called Income-Contingent Repay-
ment (ICR), which is only available for borrowers with Direct Loans.20 
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ICR, which is still available, provides less relief than IBR in most cases. 
Direct Loan borrowers in any of these repayment plans who also work 
for public or nonprofi t employers may have their loans discharged after 
just 10 years of payments, through the Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
plan Congress created at the same time as IBR.21 
We recommend consolidating the well-intentioned, but highly 
complex, mix of currently available income-driven plans—current 
IBR, IBR for new borrowers in 2014, Pay As You Earn, and ICR—into 
one new and improved income-driven plan. Borrowers would no longer 
have to fi gure out which plans they qualify for or which of their loans 
will be covered by which payment cap or forgiveness period. Those 
already enrolled in IBR, Pay As You Earn, and ICR would have the 
option of staying put or switching to the new plan. For the purposes of 
this chapter, we refer to the new plan as Pay As You Earn 2 (PAYE2).
To simplify, strengthen, and improve access to income-driven pay-
ments, PAYE2 will be available to all borrowers, regardless of their 
debt or income level, whether their loans are Direct or FFELP, or when 
they borrowed. This will make it much easier for borrowers who want 
the assurance of manageable payments to enroll whenever it makes 
sense for them, whether it is before they make their fi rst payment, after 
they have hit a rough patch, or when they are concerned about what 
the future will bring. Rather than requiring borrowers to have a certain 
debt-to-income ratio to enroll, borrowers with higher incomes relative 
to their debt will simply make larger payments as determined by the 
plan’s sliding scale. This is already the case for those whose incomes 
rise substantially after they entered an income-driven plan. If borrowers 
have access to even lower monthly payments in another plan, and that is 
more important to them than the assurance of income-driven payments, 
they need not enroll in PAYE2.
Enabling all borrowers to enroll in PAYE2 will likely require 
adjustments in some aspects of income-driven plan design, such as the 
treatment of accrued interest, when to capitalize interest and how much, 
and whether and how borrowers can exit and reenter PAYE2. Further 
study is needed to determine optimal approaches. These changes will 
affect the benefi ts and risks of widespread enrollment in PAYE2.
PAYE2 will ensure that payments never exceed 10 percent of 
income while better targeting benefi ts. In its current design, Pay As You 
Earn has undeniable benefi ts for low- and moderate-income borrowers, 
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but it may also result in some high-income borrowers getting substantial 
forgiveness when they could well afford to pay more. PAYE2 includes 
two adjustments that better target benefi ts while assuring that monthly 
payments never exceed 10 percent of the borrower’s income and avoid-
ing arbitrary cliffs, in which borrowers in very similar situations get 
very different benefi ts. 
1) Gradually phase out the “income exclusion” for higher-
income borrowers. PAYE2, like IBR and Pay As You Earn, 
calculates monthly payments based on the borrower’s “dis-
cretionary income”—AGI minus an “income exclusion”—to 
protect income needed to cover basic living expenses. Cur-
rently, in IBR and Pay As You Earn, the income exclusion is 
150 percent of the poverty level for the borrower’s household 
size. Based on this defi nition, a borrower with a family of four 
and an AGI of $40,000 has $34,575 protected for basic living 
expenses. The family therefore has a discretionary income of 
$5,425, or $452 per month, so payments set at 10 percent of 
discretionary income would be $45 per month.22 
However, as borrowers’ incomes rise, it becomes increasingly 
unnecessary to shield a share of their earnings. Borrowers with 
very high incomes are able to devote a larger share of their total 
incomes to loan payments and still have suffi cient funds left 
over to cover basic necessities, such as food and housing. As 
a result, PAYE2 gradually phases out the income exclusion for 
borrowers with AGIs between $100,000 and $250,000, so that 
borrowers with AGIs of $250,000 or more would have their 
monthly payments calculated as 10 percent of their total AGI. 
Borrowers with AGIs below $100,000 would not be affected, 
and monthly payments for all borrowers would never be greater 
than 10 percent of their total income. The AGI levels at which 
the phase-out begins and ends would be indexed to infl ation to 
ensure fairness over time.
2) Cap all monthly payments at 10 percent of income.
Currently, in IBR and Pay As You Earn, some borrowers can 
end up paying less than 10 percent of their income, owing to 
a certain cap on their monthly payments. This occurs if, after 
entering IBR or Pay As You Earn, the borrower’s income rises 
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high enough that he no longer has a “partial fi nancial hard-
ship” (i.e., his debt-to-income ratio has declined so much that a 
10-year payment is now affordable). When this occurs, his pay-
ments are capped at the monthly amount he would have had to 
pay had he entered a 10-year standard repayment plan when he 
entered IBR. For some high-income borrowers, this cap will be 
lower than 10 percent of their incomes. Removing the current 
10-year-payment cap and instead capping payments at 10 per-
cent of income better targets income-driven repayment benefi ts 
to those who need them and prevents high-income borrowers 
from receiving substantial loan forgiveness when they could 
have afforded to pay more.23
Additionally, PAYE2 will provide forgiveness after 20 years of pay-
ments. As we have long recommended, any debt remaining after 20 
years of income-driven payments should be discharged. This will make 
it easier for borrowers to see the light at the end of the tunnel, and 
let them focus on saving for retirement and their children’s education 
before the next generation is in college. The changes to payment deter-
minations described above better target the forgiveness available after 
20 years because higher-income borrowers will be more likely to pay 
off their debts within that period.
Furthermore, we recommend making it easier for all borrowers 
in income-driven plans to keep their income information up to date. 
Regardless of how many income-driven plans there are, there is a 
need to further improve the process through which borrowers provide 
updated income information to their loan servicers. Currently, borrow-
ers in income-driven plans must provide tax or other income information 
each year to avoid reverting to non-income-driven payments that may 
be much higher than they can afford. Recent improvements require that 
borrowers be notifi ed before they have to submit information and make 
it easier for some borrowers to submit it to their servicer (U.S Depart-
ment of Education 2012a). Additionally, in late 2012, the Department 
of Education launched a user-friendly tool that lets borrowers elec-
tronically transfer their own tax information from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) into an online form, both to apply for income-driven plans 
and to update their income information (U.S. Department of Education 
2012b). Unfortunately, this process is only available to borrowers who 
have fi led an IRS 1040 form. Borrowers with incomes too low to owe 
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federal income tax may not have a 1040 form to draw from, requiring 
them to go through extra steps to verify their incomes. As a result, bor-
rowers with the greatest need for income-driven payments may have 
the hardest time continuing to qualify for them.
To simplify the process for all borrowers, the income verifi cation 
process for PAYE2 should enable borrowers to draw on earnings data in 
their W-2 and 1099 forms. In addition, borrowers should be able to give 
the Department of Education advance permission to access their AGI 
and W-2 information for some period of time (e.g., fi ve years), as they 
could until recently for IBR and ICR, to reduce the risk of inadvertently 
missing a deadline.
Finally, any forgiven loan balances should not be treated as taxable 
income. Borrowers currently enrolled in IBR, ICR, and Pay As You 
Earn, as well as those who would be enrolled in our proposed PAYE2 
plan, can have their loan balances forgiven after 20 or 25 years (depend-
ing on the program) of qualifying payments. Treating discharged loans 
as taxable income creates a tax liability that most recipients will be 
unable to afford, discourages enrollment in income-driven repayment 
plans, and is inconsistent with the treatment of other discharged loans.24
Improve the Timing, Content, and Effectiveness of Student 
Loan Counseling
Federal law and regulations require entrance and exit counseling 
for any student who receives a federal loan.25 Entrance counseling has 
the potential to help students optimize their borrowing and better under-
stand the risks and benefi ts, and exit counseling has the potential to help 
students select an appropriate repayment plan and avoid default. How-
ever, the timing and content of required counseling must be improved 
to better help students borrow wisely, complete college without burden-
some debt, and repay their loans. With common-sense modifi cations 
and more research on what works, loan counseling can more effectively 
inform crucial decisions about borrowing and repayment.
Loan counseling should be conducted when it is most likely to have 
an impact: before students commit to borrowing. Currently, entrance 
counseling can occur after the promissory note is signed, as long as 
the counseling comes before the fi rst loan disbursement. This timing 
problem can and must be fi xed. Also, whereas entrance counseling is 
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only required when students fi rst borrow, interim counseling should 
take place at key points when borrowers are likely to benefi t, such as 
when they have borrowed over a certain amount or sought certifi cation 
of a private loan.
To be more effective, loan counseling must be individualized based 
on the borrower’s specifi c situation and needs; it should not just dis-
close general information and options. Entrance counseling could give 
students an estimate of their total debt burden if they borrow the amount 
they are seeking in each year they plan to be in school and also provide 
the resulting monthly and total payments under different plans. Exit 
counseling could ask students about their plans and preferences and 
point them toward specifi c repayment plans based on this information. 
For instance, if a student has borrowed a small amount and has secured 
a job with suffi cient pay, the counseling might encourage her to select 
a 10-year fi xed payment plan to minimize the total amount she will pay 
over the life of the loan. On the other hand, if the student has borrowed 
a large amount and is unsure how much she is likely to earn, the coun-
seling might highlight income-driven repayment as a way to keep her 
payments affordable. Currently, counseling does not have to be tailored 
to the individual student’s situation and can, for example, use average 
loan amounts rather than the amount the student has actually borrowed.
Entrance and interim loan counseling should include warnings 
about the risks of private loans and discourage students from consider-
ing them if they have not exhausted their federal loan options. Students 
need to understand the protections and benefi ts that come from federal 
loans, including set and predictable interest rates, fl exible repayment 
plans, deferment options, and forgiveness programs, before they take 
out a private loan. To the extent possible, exit counseling should include 
any private loan debt so students can select a repayment plan for their 
federal loans based on an understanding of their total debt, including 
any private loans.
Finally, all loan counseling should be consumer tested and improved 
based on feedback, and ongoing analysis should be conducted of coun-
seling’s impact on student decisions. For instance, existing data systems 
could be used to assess the impact of variations in entrance, interim, and 
exit counseling on student enrollment, persistence, borrowing, repay-
ment, and default rates. Such analysis could be used to continually 
improve the counseling to better support student success, prevent loan 
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defaults and unwise or unnecessary borrowing, and reduce the burden 
of student debt by helping students choose appropriate repayment plans.
Strengthen Consumer Protections
We recommend strengthening consumer protections to support 
smart borrowing, to prevent default, and to reduce the fi nancial distress 
of borrowers with federal and private loans. 
Federal loan borrowers 
As a form of fi nancial aid, federal student loans provide many 
important consumer protections that are not required of private edu-
cation loans or other types of fi nancing. Examples include discharges 
under circumstances such as school fraud, school closure, severe and 
permanent disability, or death; income-driven repayment plans that 
help ensure affordable payments and a light at the end of the tunnel; 
deferments and forbearances that let borrowers temporarily suspend 
payments without becoming delinquent or paying additional fees; and 
an opportunity to reenter repayment after default. Such policies are 
supposed to prevent or reduce defaults, unfair treatment, and extreme 
fi nancial distress for borrowers who used federal loans to help pay for 
their own or their child’s education. Unfortunately, the federal loan 
system does not work as well as it should to protect borrowers in chal-
lenging circumstances. The recommendations presented in this section 
are aimed at reducing red tape for distressed, disabled, or defrauded 
federal loan borrowers and reducing and preventing defaults. While far 
from comprehensive, these recommendations touch on several impor-
tant areas for improvement in ways that address the interests of both 
borrowers and taxpayers.
Respond to signs of fi nancial distress in ways that can 
prevent default.
• Ensure that borrowers receive key information about their 
repayment options not only before they make their fi rst payment 
but also when their payment patterns indicate likely fi nancial 
distress. For example, in 2012, a dozen members of Congress 
urged the Secretary of Education to alert borrowers to the avail-
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ability of IBR and related plans as soon as those borrowers have 
been delinquent, in forbearance, or in economic hardship or 
unemployment deferment for more than 60 days (U.S. House 
of Representatives 2012).26 Despite efforts to make repayment 
more manageable, default rates have risen even among those 
who entered repayment after IBR became available (TICAS 
2012e). Borrowers struggling to keep up with monthly pay-
ments clearly need this information and related counseling. 
Once distressed borrowers are aware of income-driven repay-
ment and how it could help them, they might also benefi t from 
information about extended repayment plans, deferments, for-
bearances, and conditions for cancellation.
• Automatically enroll severely delinquent borrowers in an 
income-driven repayment plan. It takes at least nine months 
of nonpayment to default on a federal student loan. The fed-
eral loan promissory note should require borrowers to give the 
Department of Education permission to access their IRS infor-
mation if they miss at least six consecutive payments. Using 
their income and family size, the Department of Education 
could then determine what their income-driven payment would 
be.27 If it were less than their current payment, the Depart-
ment of Education would notify the borrower and, unless they 
chose another plan, automatically enroll the borrower in the 
income-driven plan. For borrowers with very low incomes, 
income-driven payments may be as little as $0, and income-
driven payments will be lower than 10-year payments for most 
borrowers under fi nancial strain. By enrolling them and engag-
ing in follow-up contact and counseling, the Department of 
Education may be able to prevent otherwise very likely defaults 
and the associated costs for both borrowers and taxpayers. 
Notifi cation and ease of use will be essential to this policy’s 
effectiveness, as borrowers need to know that their payment 
has been lowered and how and why to update their income and 
family size at least annually.
Determine why most delinquent borrowers are not successfully 
contacted before they default. Data show that a signifi cant number 
of borrowers who default were never successfully contacted by their 
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lenders because their lenders did not have current contact information 
(U.S. Department of Education 2010). It will be very diffi cult to reduce 
default rates and help more borrowers enroll in affordable repayment 
plans if servicers and/or the Department of Education lack accurate, 
up-to-date contact information for federal loan borrowers or functional 
systems for reaching them. The Department of Education should con-
duct a study to determine the main causes of this serious problem, use 
the fi ndings to identify needed changes, make any such changes that 
are within its authority, and recommend that Congress make additional 
changes if necessary.
Reconsider the use of private debt collectors for federal stu-
dent loans. Currently, the federal student loans collections process is 
almost entirely in the hands of private debt collection agencies (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury 2009). These debt collectors are given the 
authority to act on behalf of the lender or guarantor in everything from 
rehabilitation of a defaulted loan to information about loan discharges 
to negotiating loan compromises. Because their contracts with the 
Department of Education provide bigger rewards for collecting larger 
dollar amounts, these debt collectors have a disincentive to inform 
borrowers of their rights or to set reasonable and affordable payment 
amounts based on the borrowers’ fi nancial circumstances, as required 
by law (Hechinger 2012). Given the commission structure and confl icts 
of interest, it is not surprising that the National Consumer Law Center 
has found a remarkable amount of deceptive, unfair, and illegal conduct 
by private collectors involving federal student loans (Loonin 2012). 
Recent news investigations have also documented such conduct and the 
underlying “boiler-room” business model (Hechinger 2012 and Martin 
2012). 
Collections should prioritize the interests of borrowers and taxpay-
ers, not collection agencies. With the Department of Education spending 
more than $1.4 billion a year on commission-based contracts with pri-
vate debt collectors, an examination of whether outsourcing is the most 
effective or appropriate approach is long overdue (Martin 2012). In 
2009, the IRS conducted an extensive review of its private collections 
contracts and moved to bring the function in-house (IRS 2009). The 
Treasury Department is responsible for the collection of debt owed to 
the federal government but has delegated to the Education Department 
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the authority to collect on defaulted student loans.28 We recommend 
that the Treasury Department withdraw the delegation of its authority 
for a randomly selected number of defaulted loans for the purpose of 
studying whether taxpayers’ and borrowers’ interests would be better 
served by collecting all defaulted federal student loans by trained Trea-
sury employees rather than by private debt collectors.
Rethink default penalties to ensure that distressed borrowers 
have a way out. While there should clearly be some penalties asso-
ciated with defaulting on a federal student loan, they should not be 
designed to keep borrowers without fi nancial means in default indefi -
nitely, with already unmanageable debt just continuing to mount. For 
example, collection fees of up to 25 percent are currently added to what 
borrowers owe when they default, even if the actual costs of the collec-
tions activities are much less.29 These fees go to the private collection 
agencies discussed above. If a borrower went into default because she 
could not afford her loan payments, high fees make it even less likely 
that she will ever be able to get out of default. Another policy that can 
trap borrowers in default is limiting them to only one chance at rehabili-
tation. It is worth considering whether borrowers who redefault should 
be allowed to rehabilitate their loans more than once after some period 
of successful payments.
Ensure that borrowers who are abused or defrauded by a col-
lege can get relief. The Department of Education should use its full 
authority to enforce the law that relieves borrowers of debt resulting 
from illegal or abusive school practices. The “false certifi cation” provi-
sions in law are designed to offer relief for harmed students as well as 
to discourage illegal, abusive school practices. The law provides for 
the discharge of loans falsely certifi ed by institutions and for the Sec-
retary to recover the loan amounts from the schools and their affi liates. 
While the statutory authority is broad, the Department of Education 
has interpreted these false certifi cation provisions very narrowly, deny-
ing needed relief to borrowers who suffered harm at the hands of their 
school. Borrowers should be eligible for relief if, for example, a school 
improperly or falsely certifi es students’ satisfactory academic progress, 
enrolls students in career education programs that lack the program-
matic accreditation necessary for employment in the occupation, enrolls 
students who do not speak English in programs taught only in English, 
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or enrolls students with criminal records in programs that prepare them 
for employment in professions from which they are barred because of 
their criminal record.30 The regulations must be revised so that borrow-
ers can count on relief from debts resulting from a school’s harmful 
actions when there is reasonable evidence that the harm took place.31 
Private loan borrowers 
As discussed earlier, private education loans are a much riskier way 
to pay for college than federal student loans. Whether private loan rates 
are variable or fi xed, lower-income students often receive the worst 
rates and terms, and private loans do not have the important borrower 
protections and repayment options that come with federal loans. The fol-
lowing policy changes would help prevent students from unnecessarily 
taking out risky private loans, ensure that consumers have information 
they need to make wise borrowing decisions, and stop deceptive and 
predatory private lending practices.
Prevent unnecessary private loan borrowing by requiring 
school certifi cation of private loans. The majority of undergraduates 
who borrow private education loans could have borrowed more in fed-
eral student loans before turning to the riskier private market (TICAS 
2011a). Unfortunately, many students who borrow private loans—and 
the parents who cosign these loans—do not understand the difference 
between federal and private loans until it is too late (TICAS 2011c). 
Requiring private lenders to confi rm a borrower’s eligibility with his 
or her school before disbursing the loan ensures the student is eligible 
for that loan and the loan amount. It also gives the school a chance 
to help the student make an informed borrowing decision. Before the 
credit crunch, about a third of all private loans to undergraduates were 
made without such school certifi cation (U.S. Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau and U.S. Department of Education 2012). Currently, 
most lenders voluntarily ask schools to certify their private loans, but 
lenders are not required to do so, and changing credit conditions could 
once again create incentives to cut schools out of the loop. In addition, 
many schools do not take the opportunity to counsel students before 
certifying. Students, schools, and lenders, as well as the U.S. Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Department of Educa-
tion, have all endorsed requiring “school certifi cation” of private loans, 
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including notifying the student of any remaining federal aid eligibility 
before the loan is certifi ed.32 The CFPB could require such certifi cation 
for all private loans, and legislation introduced in 2013 (S. 113 and H.R. 
3612) would do so as well (Durbin 2013; Polis 2013).
Treat private loans like other consumer debt in bankruptcy. 
Since 2005, it has been much more diffi cult to discharge private edu-
cation loans than credit cards and other consumer debt in bankruptcy, 
often leaving even the most destitute borrowers with no way out. A joint 
report to Congress from the CFPB and Department of Education found 
that this change coincided with rapid growth in questionable lending 
practices, compounding the risk to student borrowers (CFPB and U.S. 
Department of Education 2012). It also found a lack of evidence to sup-
port industry claims that restricting bankruptcy rights improved loan 
prices or access to credit. House and Senate legislation (the Fairness 
for Struggling Students Act of 2013 and the Private Student Loan Bank-
ruptcy Fairness Act of 2013) would restore fair bankruptcy treatment to 
private loan borrowers and is supported by TICAS and a broad coalition 
representing students, consumers, and colleges.33
Enable private loan borrowers to refi nance or modify their 
loans. Borrowers who face unmanageably high payments on their pri-
vate loans do not have access to lower payments through IBR or other 
federal repayment plans, and private lenders are not required to provide 
the types of repayment options and borrower protections that are built 
into federal loans, such as unemployment deferments and forbearances 
without fees. Private loans typically have variable interest rates that are 
highest for the students and cosigners who can least afford them. Those 
who borrowed their loans at a high rate are often unable to refi nance 
despite historically low interest rates in the economy, even if their cur-
rent credit score would qualify them for a lower fi xed or variable rate 
if they took out a loan today (CFPB 2012). Keeping borrowers locked 
into high rates and high payments poses risks not only to their ability 
to meet basic needs but also to retirement savings and homeownership, 
and to the broader economy as a result (Chopra 2012; CFPB 2012). We 
recommend that the CFPB and Congress develop standards for loan 
refi nancing and/or modifi cation to make private loan borrowers’ debt 
more manageable.34
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CONCLUSION
The American Dream envisions a nation where everyone can fully 
participate in our democracy, and our fates are determined by ability 
and accomplishment rather than circumstances of birth. Ensuring col-
lege access and increasing student success are crucial to achieving and 
preserving that dream and the economic opportunity and mobility on 
which it depends. College education is increasingly the primary path to 
stable employment, higher wages, retirement benefi ts, and health insur-
ance, as well as a key predictor of civic participation, better health, 
and the next generation’s odds of getting ahead—or at least not falling 
behind. An educated workforce is also essential to America’s economic 
competitiveness; our nation needs more people to get quality training 
and education after high school than ever before. However, as college 
education has become more essential for all these reasons, income gaps 
in enrollment and completion have widened rather than narrowed.
To meet the broadly shared goal of greatly increasing the share of 
Americans with a college education, federal student aid policies, includ-
ing those related to student loans, must be improved to better support 
access and success for lower-income students. When student fi nancial 
aid works as it should, students who are willing to study hard can afford 
to go to college, which is what we mean by college access, and they can 
complete a meaningful degree or certifi cate without burdensome debt, 
which is what we mean by student success.
Notes
1. Calculations by TICAS on 2011–2012 data from the College Board (2012).
2. For more information about both subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford Loans, see 
http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized (accessed June 11, 
2014).
3. For the most recent federal loan cohort default rates, see https://studentaid
.ed.gov/about/data-center/student/default from the U.S. Department of Education 
(accessed June 11, 2014). 
4. The Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act signed into law in the summer of 2013 
ties interest rates for new Stafford and PLUS Loans to the 10-year Treasury note 
yield when the loan was issued, but the rates are still not based on the govern-
ment’s actual cost of lending and running the loan program. 
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5. This refers to the fact that interest rates for One Loans are lower when borrowers 
are in school, and higher when they enter repayment. If students discontinue their 
studies, whether temporarily (stop out) or permanently (drop out), they will no 
longer qualify for the lower in-school interest rate (though the in-school interest 
rate will still cover the six-month grace period after students leave school.)
6. Enacted in the summer of 2013, the Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act capped 
interest rates for undergraduate Stafford Loans at 8.25 percent, graduate Stafford 
Loans at 9.5 percent, and PLUS Loans at 10.5 percent. 
7. For information on swaptions, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swaption (accessed 
June 11, 2014).
8. For more information about existing deferments for federal student loans, see http://
studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/deferment-forbearance (accessed June 11, 2014).
9. The grace period interest subsidy was temporarily eliminated for loans issued in 
2012–2013 and 2013–2014.
10. For more information on independent students, see TICAS, Education Trust, and 
CLASP (2012).
11. For more information about federal loan consolidation, see http://studentaid
.ed.gov/repay-loans/consolidation (accessed June 11, 2014).
12. For more information about the extended repayment plan, see http://studentaid
.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/extended (accessed June 11, 2014).
13. All of the borrower’s Direct and FFELP Loans count in determining eligibility for 
IBR and Pay As You Earn, with the exception of Parent PLUS and consolidation 
loans that repaid Parent PLUS Loans. For more information, see http://studentaid
.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-based and http://studentaid.ed.gov/
repay-loans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-earn (accessed June 11, 2014).
14. Depending on total educational indebtedness, a borrower with a Direct Consolida-
tion Loan has access to a “standard” repayment period of 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, or 
30 years in a non-income-based plan. For more information, see http://loanconsol
idation.ed.gov/examples/repyperiod.html from the U.S. Department of Education 
(accessed June 11, 2014). The Direct Consolidation Loan program defi nes total 
debt for this purpose as total Direct Loan debt plus FFELP debt up to the same 
amount as the Direct Loan total. For more information about the defi nition, see 
http://1.usa.gov/WBrewl (accessed June 11, 2014). 
15. For more information about the payments that qualify for Public Service Loan For-
giveness, which include 10-year payments and payments made in income-driven 
plans, see http://1.usa.gov/OjQu3p (accessed June 11, 2014).
16. For example, in 2008, 1 in 10 graduates from four-year colleges had at least 
$40,000 in student loans, up from just 3 percent in 1996 (using constant 2008 dol-
lars) (TICAS 2010). 
17. The IBR plan was created as part of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act 
of 2007. 
18. For more information about the Plan for Fair Loan Payments and support for its 
goals, see “The Plan for Fair Loan Payments,” The Project on Student Debt, http://
bit.ly/VLVIbj (accessed June 11, 2014). 
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19. For more information about IBR, see http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/under
stand/plans/income-based and http://IBRinfo.org (accessed June 11, 2014).
20. For more information about ICR, see http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/
understand/plans/income-contingent (accessed June 11, 2014). 
21. For more information about Public Service Loan Forgiveness, see http://student
aid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/public-service and http://
www.ibrinfo.org/what.vp.html#pslf (accessed June 11, 2014).
22. Calculations by TICAS based on data from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (2012).
23. The Obama administration and others have also proposed eliminating the stan-
dard payment cap so that borrowers in income-driven repayment plans are always 
making payments based on their incomes. See, for example, U.S. Department of 
Education (2014) and HCM Strategists et al. (2014). 
24. The Obama Administration and a bipartisan group of representatives have pro-
posed preventing debt discharged under IDR plans from being considered taxable 
income. For more information, see U.S. Department of the Treasury (2014) and 
H.R. 2492 (2009).
25. For information on current loan counseling requirements, see the U.S. Department 
of Education (2012c). For information on the federal regulations regarding loan 
counseling, see 34 CFR 685.304, http://bit.ly/XtgttB (accessed June 11, 2014).
26. In the fall of 2013, the U.S. Department of Education reached out by e-mail to 
over 3 million federal student loan borrowers, including those carrying higher than 
average debt or showing signs of fi nancial distress, to inform them about income-
driven repayment options. See U.S. Department of Education (2013c).
27. Income would be adjusted gross income (AGI) or, if no tax form were available 
for the past two tax years, wages from W-2 forms. While the family size defi nition 
may not be identical to the U.S. Department of Education’s defi nition, it is a proxy 
under these circumstances and could be amended by the borrower. 
28. As specifi ed in 31 U.S.C.§3711: “For purposes of this section, the Secretary of the 
Treasury may designate, and withdraw such designation of debt collection centers 
operated by other Federal agencies. The Secretary of the Treasury shall desig-
nate such centers on the basis of their performance in collecting delinquent claims 
owed to the Government.”
29. For more information, see https://www.myeddebt.com/borrower/collectionCosts
Navigate (accessed June 11, 2014).
30. For examples of teachers being pressured to manipulate grades in order to retain 
students, see Field (2011). 
31. For more information, see comments on false certifi cation in TICAS (2011b). 
32. For more information, see the December 10, 2009, letter signed by 25 organiza-
tions in support of mandatory certifi cation. See http://bit.ly/Y1qwUN (accessed 
June 11, 2014). Also see the May 7, 2010, letter signed by lenders and others urg-
ing inclusion of mandatory school certifi cation in the Senate fi nancial reform bill, 
referenced in Lederman (2010). 
33. For more information, see the coalition letter to Senator Durbin in support of 
the Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013, available at http://projecton
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studentdebt.org/pub_view.php?idx=872 (accessed June 11, 2014), and the coalition 
letter to Representative Cohen in support of the Private Student Loan Bankruptcy 
Fairness Act of 2013, available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/pub_view
.php?idx=871 (accessed June 11, 2014).
34. The Refi nancing Education Funding to Invest for the Future Act was introduced in 
the summer of 2013 and endorsed by TICAS. For more information about the bill, 
see S. 1266 of the act and Brown (2013). 
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